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Abstract: 
This paper attempts to resolve the puzzle associated with the non-spatiality of monads by 
investigating the possibility that Leibniz employed a version of the extension of power 
doctrine, a Scholastic concept that explains the relationship between immaterial and 
material beings. As will be demonstrated, not only does the extension of power doctrine 
lead to a better understanding of Leibniz’ reasons for claiming that monads are non-
spatial, but it also supports those interpretations of Leibniz’ metaphysics that accepts the 
real extension of bodies. 
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A long-standing problem in Leibniz’ late metaphysics concerns the spatial status of 
the monads: in short, monads bring about extended matter, and hence space, but are not 
themselves in space or spatially related to one another. This quandary has prompted some 
commentators to deny the spatiality or extension of Leibnizian bodies altogether, while 
simultaneously rejecting a purely idealist or Berkeley-style reading that treats bodies as 
entirely mental items.1 Other commentators, in contrast, have nonetheless strived to 
uphold extension as a real bodily feature in addressing the perplexing difficulties 
associated with the spatiality of monads. Yet, how can a commitment to the view that 
Leibnizian bodies exist in the external world and are really extended in length, breadth, 
and width (although perhaps not identical to continuous geometrical extension)—a view 
we will dub the “real extension” hypothesis—reconcile the non-spatiality of monads with 
the spatially extended bodies that arise from monads? In this essay, we will attempt to 
                                                
1 Henceforth, “spatiality”, as used with reference to monads concerns the relationship 
between monad and space; thus, the non-spatiality monads means that they are not 
situated in space. As used with respect to bodies, spatiality refers to their extension in 
length, breadth, and width; hence, to declare that bodies are non-spatial means that bodies 
are not really extended (in the external world), but only appear extended. 
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answer this question by examining the possibility that Leibniz may have utilized a variant 
of the “extension of power” doctrine, an hypothesis that Descartes and many Scholastics 
had employed as a means of explicating how an unextended immaterial being relates to 
extended matter. In various late metaphysical discussions, Leibniz refers to this doctrine 
and other related concepts within the context of discussing extension and the primitive 
and derivative force of monads. Given this added information, it will be argued that some 
of the key questions concerning the spatiality of monads, as well as the motivation 
underlying various aspects of Leibniz’ theory, gain considerable insight and clarity. In 
short, the extension of power doctrine may constitute the best means of defending the real 
extension hypothesis. 
While section 1 will survey the problem of monadic situation as well as various 
solutions that have been put forward by several prominent commentators, section 2 will 
present evidence for the extension of powers doctrine alongside an argument that relies 
on the important function of primitive and derivative force to explain how real extension 
can arise from monads.  
 
1. The Interpretive Challenge Posed by Monadic Situation.  
In his late metaphysics, Leibniz holds that monads are without parts, non-extended, 
and form composites or aggregates, which are merely collections of monads, i.e., bodies 
(“bodies are only aggregates”, G VII 344; AG 319), and possess merely an ideal unity (G 
II 256). Yet, Leibniz also insists that bodies are the results of monads: “properly 
speaking, matter is not composed of constitutive unities [monads], but results from them” 
(G II 268; AG 179). Despite the fact that extended matter results from monads, Leibniz 
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repeatedly denies that monads are spatial: e.g., “there is no absolute or spatial nearness or 
distance between monads” (June 16, 1712; LDB 255), and, “monads in themselves do not 
even have situation with respect to each other—at least one that is real, which extends 
beyond the order of phenomena” (May 26, 1712; LDB 241-243). Yet, Leibniz also insists 
that monads retain a sort of derived position within matter: “although monads are not 
extended, they nevertheless have a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, 
namely, through the machine which they control” (G II 253; L 531).2  
Leibniz’ puzzling claim, that monads have a certain type of situation in extension, has 
prompted various interpretations. One possibility is to lean heavily on the mind-based 
aspects of Leibniz’ theory, as argued in Futch (2008): 
The solution . . . is to see Leibniz as assigning a monad the position of its body 
considered representationally, not realistically as an aggregate. . . . But it is the body 
as represented, as an intentional object, that confers on its representing monad a 
spatial position. (Futch 2008, 159-160) 
 
Variants on this phenomenalist solution to the problem of monadic situation can be found 
in, among others, Rutherford (1995, 192) and Adams (1983, 242), with the emphasis 
placed on linking the “derived position” of monads in bodies, as we will call it, with the 
monad’s own intentional, mind-dependent states. This interpretation is thus in accordance 
                                                
2 While the topic of our investigation concerns the question of the spatial situation of 
Leibniz’ monads in his later metaphysics, roughly from the late 1690s onward, it is worth 
noting that Leibniz’ earlier work seems to support the same non-spatial status for 
souls/minds as one finds in the later output. In a tract from 1668-1670, he writes (in 
Cartesian vein) that “[w]hatever is not a body is not in space; for to be in space is the 
definition of a body” (L 113; G IV 110). The same outlook is likewise in evidence in the 
middle years, 1680s and 1690s: in A New System of the Nature and the Communication of 
Substances, from 1695 (G IV 477-487), Leibniz claims that “[m]inds thus have special 
laws that place them beyond the revolutions of matter” (L 455), i.e., after explaining that 
his pre-established harmony thesis forbids souls from “disturbing the laws” of matter, he 
nevertheless concludes that “[t]his makes it clear how the souls has its seat in the body by 
an immediate presence” (L 458). 
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with the “ideal” status that Leibniz attributes to the continuous and holistic notions, space 
and time: “For space is something continuous, but ideal, whereas mass is discrete, indeed 
an actual multiplicity, or a being by aggregation, but one from infinite unities [monads]. 
In actual things, simples are prior to aggregates; in ideals things, the whole is prior to the 
part” (September 6, 1709; LDB 141). Yet, while there is much merit to holding that 
monads have only a derived position in space, a realist about Leibnizian extension is left 
with few resources and little guidance in explaining how this hypothesis fits into their 
realist interpretation, i.e., the “real extension” hypothesis.3       
In contrast, Daniel Garber has tried to rescue something like the view that monads 
possess a primary, as opposed to derivative, spatiality by recourse to several passages 
from the Des Bosses correspondence: first (July 21, 1707), “a simple substance, even 
though it does not have extension in itself, nonetheless has position, which is the 
foundation of extension” (LDB 99); and, second (April 30, 1709), “extension indeed 
arises from situation, but it adds continuity to situation. Points have situation, but they 
neither have nor compose continuity, and they cannot subsist by themselves” (LDB 125). 
Garber argues that these passages signal a transition in Leibniz’ thinking from a view that 
bases extension on impenetrability and resistance, in the earlier metaphysics, to a new 
                                                
3 In Cover and Hartz (1994), the monadic situation puzzle is presented in the guise of a 
circularity argument: “having monads with spatial position is an essential part of the story 
about what it takes to have an aggregate, but having an aggregate with spatial location is 
an essential part of the story about what it takes to have spatially located monads” (308). 
This criticism would seem to be apt as regards Adams’ account of aggregation (1983, 
1994), where a body is reckoned to be an aggregate of “the substances whose positions 
are within some continuous three-dimensional portion of space”, and hence “[t]his spatial 
togetherness is a necessary condition for any corporeal aggregation” (1994, 248-249). 
Yet, as Cover and Hartz note (1994, 308), if monads have no spatial position with respect 
to one another, then how can they partake in the “spatial togetherness” required for an 
aggregate? 
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conception that utilizes monadic position as the source of material extension, and which 
is coupled with the phenomenal/ideal perception of mathematical extension mentioned 
above: 
The position or situation of an infinity of monads now replaces the impenetrability 
and resistance of the earlier corporeal substance view, . . . . In this way we can hold 
that extension arises from situation. But the infinity of monads situated with respect 
to one another is discrete, and not continuous, of course. In imposing a full-blown 
Euclidean geometrical structure onto the world of situated monads, we are adding 
continuity. (Garber 2009, 361-362) 
 
Consequently, it would seem to follow that monads exist in a sort of discrete ur-space, 
with a discrete distance among monads rather than a continuous Euclidean distance, 
although the contribution of the mind is responsible for our perceptions of a continuous 
Euclidean space. 
There are numerous difficulties with this view, however. First, as Cover and Hartz 
argue (1994, 300), the 1707 quotation (LDB 99) that Garber employs as the basis of his 
interpretation only discusses extension, and not space, and so the position of the simple 
substance mentioned in the quote is likely a reference to its position in a body’s 
extension, the latter being a well-founded phenomenon. Therefore, Leibniz’ analysis in 
the 1707 passage is perfectly in keeping with his earlier explanations to De Volder that 
deem monads as having a derived spatiality in bodily extension (such as G II 253, quoted 
above). Second, if Garber’s analysis is correct, and monads have position in a discrete ur-
space, then monads would seem to reside in the points of that discrete space (since spatial 
points have situation in that discrete space, and are the basis upon which Euclidean 
extension is phenomenally imposed). But, in the 1709 letter to Des Bosses cited by 
Garber, Leibniz rejects the view that souls, which are often associated with monads (e.g., 
G IV 512-513), are in points: “I do not think it appropriate to regard souls as though in 
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points” (LDB 125). In response, Garber could claim that Leibniz is here rejecting the 
placement of souls in the points of Euclidean space, but is instead advocating that they 
are situated in the points of a discrete space—yet, as a counter-reply, it is not clear that a 
non-dimensional spatial point in a discrete space really differs at all from a non-
dimensional point in a continuous space; nor is there any textual evidence to back up 
Leibniz’ use of any such distinction. More importantly, not only does Leibniz specifically 
rebuff the idea that monads are in space in the subsequent correspondence with Des 
Bosses (see the various 1712 entries cited above), but he explains at great length that any 
assignment of spatiality to monads—nearness, distance, or that they are in points—is 
purely fictional and misguided: 
[T]here is no absolute or spatial nearness or distance between monads. To say that 
they are crowded together in a point or disseminated in space is to employ certain 
fictions of our mind when we willingly seek to imagine things that can only be 
understood. (to Des Bosses, 16 June, 1712; LDB 255; also, G III 623) 
 
In short, the generality of Leibniz’ argument would appear to cover all cases of the 
assignment of spatiality to monads, whether discrete or continuous, and thus a position or 
distance among monads in a discrete space would likely run afoul of this critique as well.  
But the question remains, if monads are non-spatial, as the evidence of the texts 
indicates, then how do aggregates (i.e., bodies), which result from monads, acquire 
spatiality? One possibility is to simply deny that aggregates are spatial, rather, aggregate 
spatiality is a further contribution of the mind. This interpretational strategy does not lead 
to Berkeleyan-style idealism, argues Hartz, since an aggregate “is real, active, and has 
force” (Hartz 2007, 133). The reality posited to the monads in this reconstruction of 
Leibniz’ system hence relates in some manner to force, which is physical (contra 
idealism). A somewhat different realist strategy that also denies the real extension of 
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bodies can be found in Rutherford (1990), an approach that places the emphasis on the 
constitutive relationship between monads and aggregates. While aggregates are 
“necessarily mind-dependent”, Rutherford adds that “[i]t does not follow from this, 
however, that aggregates are nothing real; on the contrary, Leibniz maintains that in 
terms of their reality aggregates are to be identified with the plurality of things from 
which they result [monads]” (1990, 20). Put simply, the fact that monads are constitutive 
of matter and bodies, a point that Leibniz consistently invokes, is hard to square with 
idealism: if bodies are merely mental content, then why demand that “an aggregate is 
nothing other than all those things taken at the same time from which it results” (G II 
256)? 
Yet, for those who embrace the real extension hypothesis, Hartz and Rutherford’s 
interpretations are unacceptable. For these realists, an interpretation of Leibniz’ system 
must uphold the real extension of bodies, even if the continuous Euclidean extension by 
which we perceive and understand bodies is an ideal contribution of the mind. Given this 
presupposition, Garber’s thesis that (secondary) matter is really discrete and non-
continuous, despite our perceptions that impose a continuous structure, is a more 
plausible method of preserving real bodily extension. The trick, consequently, would then 
be to preserve something like Garber’s notion of a discrete extended material world 
alongside Cover and Hartz’ persuasive denial of monadic spatiality—a very tall order 
indeed. In what follows, we will examine important clues that can assist in the 
development of a truly spatial account of Leibnizian bodies, an aspect of Leibniz’ 
metaphysics that has seldom received the attention it deserves. 
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2. Monads and the “Extension of Power” 
This section develops an interpretation of Leibniz’ later metaphysics that accepts that 
bodies are really extended, although the form of that extension is not identical with 
geometrical/mathematical extension. It should be noted, however, that the interpretation 
offered in this section is only one possible strategy for upholding the real extension of 
Leibnizian bodies, and hence its success or failure does not in itself affect the relevance 
of the key doctrine that we shall introduce, the extension of power, for addressing the 
monadic situation problem. In contrast, the extension of power doctrine probably offers 
little advantage for those realist interpretations that deny the spatiality of both monads 
and bodies, although it might be useful in understanding the historical and conceptual 
backdrop to Leibniz’ comments on the non-spatiality of monads (i.e., outside of their 
derived spatiality in matter).  
2.1. Incorporeal Beings and Space. Important clues as to what exactly may be driving 
Leibniz’ puzzling conception of the non-spatiality of monads can be found in many late 
period works, including a discussion in the New Essays on the ways that a being can be 
related to place or space: 
The Scholastics have three sorts of ubeity, or ways of being somewhere. The first 
is called circumscriptive. It is attributed to bodies in space which are in it point for 
point, so that measuring them depends on being able to specify points in the located 
thing corresponding to points in space. The second is the definitive. In this case, one 
can “define”—i.e. determine—that the located thing lies within a given space without 
being able to specify exact points or places which it occupies exclusively. That is how 
some people have thought that the soul is in the body, because they have not thought 
it possible to specify an exact point such that the soul or something pertaining to it is 
there and at no other point. Many competent people still take that view. . . . What 
should be said about angels is, I believe, about the same as what is said about souls. 
The great Thomas Aquinas believed that an angel can be in a place only through its 
operations [upon what is there], which on my theory are not immediate and are just a 
matter of the pre-established harmony. The third kind of ubeity is repletive. God is 
said to have it, because he fills the entire universe in a more perfect way than minds 
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fill bodies, for he operates immediately on all created things, continually producing 
them, whereas finite minds cannot immediately influence or operate upon them. 
(NE:II.xxiii.21) 
 
While circumscriptive ubeity maps bodies to space over an extended region in a point by 
point manner, and definitive ubeity only links a spiritual being to a specific place or point 
within that region, Leibniz opts for repletive ubeity, wherein God “operates immediately” 
by continually producing things that exist in space. Much in this discussion, as the 
context makes clear, concerns finite souls and angels and how they relate to material 
bodies, whereupon Leibniz worries that the definitive account entails that souls can act 
immediately upon the things in space, with “immediately” pertaining to the soul’s acting 
directly upon things. In contrast, Leibniz prefers a view where “finite minds cannot 
immediately influence or operate upon” bodies, and he offers his theory of pre-
established harmony as an instance of this better strategy.  
In the particular correspondence with Des Bosses that we have often explored (April 
30, 1709), many of these issues resurface in the context of material extension and 
souls/monads: 
Nevertheless, I do not think it appropriate to regard souls as though in points. 
Perhaps someone might say that souls are not in place but through operation, 
speaking here according to the old system of influx; or rather, according to the new 
system of preestablished harmony, that they are in place through correspondence, and 
that in this way they are in the whole organic body that they animate. On the other 
hand, I do not deny a certain real metaphysical union between the soul and an organic 
body . . . according to which it can be said that the soul is truly in the body. . . . You 
realize, though, that until now I have been speaking here not of the union of an 
entelechy or active principle with primary matter or passive power, but the union of 
the soul or of the monad itself (which results from both principles) with mass, or with 
other monads. (LDB 123-127) 
 
Once again, Leibniz offers his notion of pre-established harmony as preferable to the 
view that souls are “in place but through operation”, which he equates with the “old 
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system of influx”. What is important, in these last few quoted passages, is that Leibniz 
does not openly reject the operation of monads, i.e., that a being can be in space only 
through its operation, a doctrine also known as “extension of power”4 (hereafter, EP); 
rather, as is more clearly stated in the prior citation from the New Essays, what Leibniz 
rejects is the immediate operation of soul on body, which he associates in the Des Bosses 
letter with the system of physical influx. As is well-known, a basic principle of Leibniz’ 
philosophy is the denial that substances can causally interact: e.g., “[s]trictly speaking, 
one can say that no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influx on any other 
thing” (Primary Truths, 1686, C 521; AG 33). 
To summarize, it is for reasons relating to his denial of inter-substance or inter-
monadic causation that Leibniz sides with pre-established harmony. Yet, leaving aside 
the inter-monadic causation issue, Leibniz’ reference to the “the old system of influx” 
would seem to draw a close analogy between, on the one hand, the monad-matter 
relationship, and, on the other, the immaterial being-matter relationship in those older 
                                                
4 In use during the Medieval period, the origin of the term “extension of power” is 
unclear, but other descriptions include “presence of power”, “virtual extension”, and 
“virtual presence”. There is an additional issue involved with EP that concerns whether 
the essence that operates immediately must be “really” present where it acts, as Aquinas 
and many others had held, or whether the essence need not be really present, as Scotus 
and Middleton had argued (see, Grant 1981, 146-147, for a brief survey). In the 1692 
correspondence with Pellisson, Leibniz defends the former thesis, stating that “everything 
that operates immediately in several places also is in several places by a true presence of 
its essence, and that the immediate operation cannot be judged to be distant from the 
individual that operates, since it is a manner of being of it” (A.I.vii.294; Adams 1994; 
357). In these letters, Leibniz even defines EP as the essence acting non-immediately, 
i.e., at a distance: “A presence by power [presence virtuelle], as opposed to a real 
presence, must be without that immediate application of the essence or primitive force, 
and happens only by actions at a distance or by intermediate operations” (A.I.vii.249; 
Adams 1994, 356). Yet, by the Des Bosses correspondence, he seems to have reversed 
himself, such that immediate operations could be at a distance: “if God should bring it 
about that something immediately operates at a distance, by that fact he would bring 
about its multipresence” (May 2, 1710; LDB 171).  
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instances of EP. Leibniz seems willing to concede the general point that a finite entity, 
soul, angel, or monad, can be conceived as in place through its operations, but only in so 
far as those operations are not immediate, i.e., there is no influx or real causal interaction, 
since the influx has been replaced by the mediation of God’s providence in establishing 
the harmony between the soul and its operations. In contrast, since God “operates 
immediately on all created things” by “continually producing them” (NE:II.xxiii.21), EP 
straightforwardly applies to God. There are several other notable instances in the later 
Leibnizian corpus where God’s immediate operation is addressed: 
God is not present to things by situation but by essence; his presence is 
manifested by his immediate operation. The presence of the soul is of quite another 
nature. To say that it is diffused all over the body is to make it extended and divisible. 
To say it is, the whole of it, in every part of the body is to make it divisible of itself. 
To fix it to a point, to diffuse it all over many points, are only abusive expressions, 
idola tribus. (Leibniz and Clarke 2000, 16-17; LC.III.12) 
 
Where space is in question, we must attribute immensity to God, and this also gives 
parts and order to his immediate operations. He is the source of possibilities and of 
existents alike, the one by his essence and the other by his will. (NE:II.xv.2) 
 
In short, God is “not present to things by situation but by essence”, yet “his presence is 
manifested by his immediate operations”, i.e., his immediate operations are given “parts 
and order” in space even though God is not actually situated in space (and where God’s 
“immensity”, as used by Leibniz, would seem to pertains to the ontological dependence 
of matter and space on God; see, LC.V.106). Therefore, to claim that God is present to 
things by essence is to claim that God’s immediate operations are situated in space, with 
God’s essence serving the more general metaphysical role of grounding the possibility of 
any existing thing. This reading seems to be upheld later in the correspondence with 
Clarke, for Leibniz rejects the view that “God discerns what passes in the world by being 
present to the things”, rather, God discerns things “by the dependence on him of the 
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continuation of their existence, which may be said to involve a continual production of 
them” (2000, 56; LC.V.85). Accordingly, since God’s immediate operation correlates 
with the continual production of the material world, the world’s spatial order thereby 
situates that continual act of production. Returning to the Leibniz-Clarke passage 
examined above (LC.III.12), Leibniz then goes on to deny that either a soul is diffused 
“all over a body”, which doubtless equates with circumscriptive ubeity in NE:II.xxiii.21, 
or that a soul is, “the whole of it, in every part of the body”, which is consistent with, 
although not identical to, his account of definitive ubeity in the same New Essays passage 
(i.e., the “whole in every part” doctrine would include definitive ubeity as used by 
Leibniz). 
For understanding the vexed subject of monadic situation, the ramifications of EP are 
quite significant, although few commentators have ventured into this territory. Since 
Leibniz uses the terms “soul” and “monad” interchangeably in his late period, if “souls 
are not in place but through operation, speaking here according to the old system of 
influx” (LDB 125)—i.e., the immediate operation of monads is hypothetically 
endorsed—then monads are, like God, in place/space by way of their operation, but not 
themselves situated in space. In short, while Leibniz does not strictly sanction EP for 
monads, his comments would seem to admit that the relationship between his non-spatial, 
non-situated monads and extended bodies is like the relationship between the non-spatial, 
non-situated immaterial beings and extended bodies in the older influx EP theory, but 
excluding the influx component of the older theory, of course. This interpretation, which 
would uphold the non-situated component of immaterial beings in the original influx 
formulation of the EP hypothesis, thereby explains why monads only have a derived 
 13 
position in space, i.e., through the body which they control.  
In brief, the main argument of this essay is that Leibniz’ puzzling reference to the 
derived position of monads in extended bodies is best understood as a non-influx, pre-
established harmony version of EP. Contra Garber, monads are not in space per se, i.e., 
situated in space, although their operations are situated in space, just as God is not in 
space but God’s operations are situated. Specifically, because Leibniz states in LDB 127 
that “the union of the soul or of the monad itself . . . with mass, or with other monads” is 
the context under which he concedes that monads are in place through their operation 
(under the influx construal), and since mass is associated with extended secondary matter 
or aggregates (e.g., G II 252; AG 177), the monads are only in place by means of 
mass/secondary matter. This inference correlates perfectly with his claims concerning the 
derived situation of monads: “although monads are not extended, they nevertheless have 
a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, namely, through the machine which 
they control” (G II 253; L 531). Furthermore, the fact that the monads themselves are not 
situated is consistent with the “real extension” hypothesis presented in section 1, where 
Leibnizian bodies are really extended but perhaps lack the continuous structure of 
geometrical extension. Hence, while rebuffing Garber’s view that monads are actually 
situated in space, the EP doctrine can provide support for Garber’s more general notion 
that there are non-continuous, discrete extended bodies. To sum up, given the non-influx 
version of EP suggested above, the only aspect of a theory that posits real extension to 
bodies that must be sacrificed is the real or actual situation of the monads in matter, and 
hence in space: like God, monads are not situated in space although their operations are 
situated. In the next section, we will take up monadic operation in more detail, but further 
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textual evidence will be examined first.   
Besides the New Essays and Des Bosses correspondence, there is additional support 
for the above interpretation of EP in the transubstantiation debate with Pellisson in 1692, 
an issue that Adams addresses at length (1994, 350-358). Despite its early date, and the 
specific worries associated with the multi-location of the Eucharist, the Pellisson 
correspondence is worth quoting for the extra details it supplies: 
[I]t is by the application to several places of this [higher] principle [of action and 
resistance], which is nothing but the primitive force of which I have spoken, or (to 
speak in more ordinary terms) the particular nature of the thing, that the 
multipresence of a body is to be saved. It is true, however, that the substance in 
concreto is something other than the Force, for it is the subject taken with that force. 
Thus the subject itself is present, and its presence is real, because it emanates 
immediately from its essence, as God determines its application to the places. . . . I 
would even say that it is not only in the Eucharist, but everywhere else, that bodies 
are present only by this application of the primitive force to the place; but this occurs 
naturally only in accordance with a certain extension, or size and shape, and in regard 
to a certain place, from which other bodies are excluded. (A.I.vii.249; Adams 1994, 
355)  
 
The story that Leibniz tells is that God applies primitive force to a place (or places) in 
order to bring about the presence of a body or substance in that place (or multiple places); 
i.e., the subject in concreto that, besides being a part of this force, has a “real” presence 
that emanates from its essence, with “essence” identified with primitive force. While this 
topic will be taken up in the next section, how the subject comes about from primitive 
force, and obtains a real presence, must implicate derivative force, but the Pellisson 
letters leave this process unexplained. At this stage in his thinking, consequently, not only 
is the essence (i.e., primitive force) of a body present in the body’s place, but, in fact, the 
same essence can be in several different places simultaneously, thereby demonstrating 
that the normal restrictions on location and spatiality do not apply to primitive force (with 
primitive force roughly equivalent to a substantial form; see, e.g., G IV 512-513; AG 
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162-163). Whether Leibniz continues to insist that the essence needs to be present in this 
manner to operate immediately seems unclear given the evidence of later texts, it should 
be noted (see endnote 4). Nevertheless, there are obvious similarities here with Leibniz’ 
later claim, in LC.III.12, that God’s essence is present to things but only his immediate 
operations are situated in space—and this lends support to the conclusion that his later 
monadic metaphysics is roughly analogous to his conception of God’s EP, as argued 
above. 
Confirmation of this reading of the evidence can likewise draw upon Adam’s 
insightful commentary on the Pellisson correspondence, although it is interesting to note 
that he overlooks the relevance of these issues to the problem of monadic situation. After 
observing that, in these texts from the 1690s, Leibniz had “already rejected the system of 
influence in favor of that of pre-established harmony, but in which he nonetheless 
ascribed to primitive forces (doubtless including souls) a local presence by immediate 
operation”, Adams concludes that, by the later Des Bosses correspondence, “being in a 
place by (immediate) operation, as affirmed in the 1690s, is reduced to being in a place 
by correspondence” (Adams 1994, 357). Not only is this inference justified, but, as 
argued above, it holds the key to understanding the monadic situation puzzle. However, 
rather than apply these findings to his own discussion of monadic situation (1994, 248-
255), Adams offers the “spatial togetherness” criterion instead (see section 1). 
There is also evidence to support the view that monadic operation, or a surrogate 
notion, is a factor in other well-known Leibnizian tracts. In these works, various 
enigmatic discussions that pertain to the “activity” of monads, or monadic change, 
assume the role that the monadic operation idea had played under the influx theory. For 
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instance, in the June 20, 1703 letter to De Volder, which contains his oft cited 
endorsement of the derived position of monads (within extended matter), he states: 
I had said that extension is the order of possible coexistents and that time is the 
order of possible inconsistents. If this is so, you say you wonder how time enters into 
all things, spiritual as well as corporeal, while extension enters only into corporeal 
things. I reply that the relations are the same in the one case as in the other, for every 
change, spiritual as well as material, has its own place, so to speak, in the order of 
time, as well as its own location in the order of coexistents, or in space. For although 
monads are not extended, they nevertheless have a certain ordered relation of 
coexistence with others, namely, through the machine which they control. (G II 253; 
L 531) 
 
That “every change, spiritual as well as material” has a situation in space is quite 
significant, for what can spiritual change mean, in the context of a discussion of monads, 
if not monadic change or monadic activity? An objection that might be raised is that 
spiritual change refers to God’s activity in this excerpt. Nevertheless, there is another 
piece of evidence that more directly cites monadic change: 
There are simple substances everywhere, actually separated from one another by their 
own actions, which continually change their relations; and each distinct simple 
substance or monad, which makes up the center of a composite substance (an animal, 
for example) and is the principle of its unity, is surrounded by a mass composed of an 
infinity of other monads, which constitutes the body belonging to this central monad, 
through whose properties the monad represents the things outside it, similarly to the 
way a center does. (Principles of Nature and Grace, 1714; G VI 598; AG 207).  
 
To insist that monads are “actually separated from one another by their own actions” 
provides further support for the spatiality of monadic activity or change, especially when 
it is recalled that by this date, 1714, Leibniz has repeatedly claimed that monads 
themselves are not in space. Put differently, how can the non-situated monads be actually 
separated by their own actions?: the answer, of course, is that he is still wedded, to some 
degree, to the extension of powers doctrine, EP, although the powers assumed in his 
theory now refer to monadic activity. One might reply that the term “separation” 
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employed in this last quote may signify a mere difference in internal properties, with no 
spatial connotations intended. Yet, in addition to the context, which implies a 
straightforward spatial interpretation, such a reading is difficult to justify given the many 
other spatial terms utilized throughout the discussion—e.g., “everywhere”, “center”, 
“surrounded”, “outside”—all of which strongly suggests that “separation” is meant in its 
normal spatial sense. 
2.2. Monadic Activity and Derivative Force. At this point in our analysis, it is 
worthwhile to more closely examine the analogy between God’s immediate operation and 
monadic operation. As we have seen, God’s continuous production of the world situates 
that act in space, even though God is not in space. For the advocates of a realistic account 
of Leibnizian extended bodies, such as Garber’s discrete body hypothesis, it would seem 
that this analogy should serve as the foundation of an EP-centered account of the 
monadic-matter relationship: monads are not in space but their operations are situated in 
space via extended matter. But, turning to the operation of monads, since Leibniz accepts 
the pre-established harmony view, whereby everything that happens is internal to a 
monad, it might appear that there is little similarity between God’s immediate operation, 
which creates matter, and monadic operation, which only involves the internal properties 
of monads. As noted above, Leibniz brings up the older influx-based notion of the 
operation of monads when discussing “the union of the soul or of the monad itself . . . 
with mass, or with other monads” (LDB 127), and the Leibnizian concept that fits this 
aspect of Leibniz’ theory is aggregation. But, while bodies depend on the aggregation 
process, aggregation is obviously not an internal aspect of monads. Nevertheless, besides 
aggregation, there is one aspect of the story of how extended bodies result from monads 
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that would appear comparable to an internal monadic operation or activity, namely, the 
role of force, both primitive and derivative. In the remainder of this essay, we will strive 
to elucidate how primitive and derivative force might function as a monadic operation 
within the context of the rise of extended matter, and thereby provide a means for 
understanding how a monad’s operation might be comparable to God’s immediate 
operation. Overall, this final section of our investigation is quite tentative, largely due to 
the difficult nature of the relationship between primitive and derivative force, an aspect of 
Leibniz’ system that is itself quite tentative and seems to have been constantly evolving. 
Consequently, what follows is merely a suggestion of what elements in Leibniz’ system 
might correlate with a monad’s activity or operation.  
In several later works, including the correspondence with De Volder, there are 
tantalizing hints that incorporate the function of derivative force in Leibniz’ aggregation 
hypothesis: 
[T]he nature which is supposed to be diffused, repeated, continued [i.e., to form 
extension of bodies via aggregation], is that which constitutes the physical body; it 
cannot be found in anything but the principle of acting and being acted upon, since 
the phenomena provide us with nothing else. . . . But when force is taken for the 
principle of action and passion, and is therefore something modified through 
derivative forces, that is, something modified through that which is momentary in 
action, you can understand well enough from what has been said that this principle is 
bound up with the very notion of extension, . . . [U]nless there is some active 
principle in us, there cannot be derivative forces and actions in us, since everything 
accidental or changeable ought to be a modification of something essential or 
perpetual, nor can it contain anything more positive than that which it modifies, since 
every modification is only a limitation, shape a limitation of that which is varied, and 
derivative force a limitation of that which brings about the variation. (June 30, 1704; 
G II 268-270; AG 179-180) 
 
Primitive force, as the principle of action and passion, is “modified through derivative 
force” in such a way that derivative force is “that which is momentary in action”; and, 
since primitive force is “essential or perpetual”, derivative force is a mere limitation, 
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adding nothing positive, as shape is a “limitation of that which is varied”. For 
understanding how monadic operation or activity might relate to the formation of 
extended matter, the references to primitive force as the principle of action, and 
derivative force as what is momentary in action, is crucial, for it brings together monadic 
action or operation and primitive/derivative force, the latter implicated in the account of 
extended matter (“this principle [primitive/derivative force] is bound up with the very 
notion of extension”).    
Accordingly, Leibniz’ somewhat perplexing idea of the derived position of monads in 
extended matter, first explored in section 1, gains a great deal more clarity when the role 
of derivative force is incorporated into the picture: “For although monads are not 
extended, they nevertheless have a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, 
namely, through the machine which they control” (G II 253; L 531). While monads are 
not spatial, derivative force is coupled to the phenomena of extended bodies, which are 
aggregates of monads, or secondary matter: “the derivative force of being acted upon 
later shows itself to different degrees in secondary matter” (GM VI 236; AG 120). So, 
monads are not situated in space, but their effects or “results” are spatial via the extended 
bodies that come about from derivative force. This last inference would seem to explain 
Leibniz’ statement that “I relegate derivative forces to the phenomena” (AG 181), a claim 
which has puzzled commentators (e.g., Garber 2009, 363), but which makes perfect sense 
given that extended bodies, i.e., well-founded phenomena, are ultimately manifestations 
or instantiations of primitive force (via derivative force). Derivative force, in turn, is then 
associated with the diffusion process: “[T]he nature which is supposed to be diffused, 
repeated, continued, is that which constitutes the physical body; it cannot be found in 
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anything but the principle of acting and being acted upon [i.e., primitive force], since the 
phenomena [i.e., a determinate value of primitive force = derivative force] provide us 
with nothing else” (G II 268; AG 179). Consequently, the means by which the non-spatial 
monads obtain spatiality involves derivative force, since extended secondary matter is 
ultimately linked to derivative force. Therefore, to return to the God-monad analogy, a 
parallel case can be made since both God’s immediate operation and a monad’s non-
immediate operation or activity are associated with the rise of extended matter, although 
in different ways. Unlike God’s immediate operation, a monad’s activity does not involve 
the creation of an entirely new entity, but this is consistent with the difference between an 
immediate operation and a non-influx version of monadic operation conceived along the 
lines of an internal feature of monads—i.e., derivative force as a determinate value of the 
primitive force internal to each monad.5 
 
3. Conclusion.  
                                                
5 It is also worthwhile comparing Leibniz and Descartes on EP, for Descartes had 
sanctioned that doctrine with respect to God, angels, and minds (souls). In his late 
correspondence with More, Descartes asserts that “[f]or my part, in God and angels and 
in our mind I understand there to be no extension of substance, but only extension of 
power. An angel can exercise power now on a greater and now on a lesser part of 
corporeal substance; but if there were no bodies, I could not conceive of any space with 
which an angel or God would be co-extensive . . .” (CSMK, 372-373; AT V 342-343). 
There is a certain similarity here in that the power of Descartes’ spiritual beings and the 
primitive force of Leibniz’ monads still remain even if there are, respectively, no actual 
Cartesian bodies or no limitation imposed on the primitive force, i.e., derivative force as a 
particular value of primitive force. On the other hand, while Cartesian matter can exist 
apart from a spiritual beings’ EP, Leibniz’ force-based conception of matter, especially 
secondary matter, denies this possibility. Leibniz was familiar with various works of 
More (e.g., The Immortality of the Soul, see, A.VI.iv.1678-1680), as well as the 
Descartes-More correspondence (L 342; G II 117). Nevertheless, given Leibniz’ 
knowledge of Scholastic metaphysics, he was almost certainly well acquainted with the 
EP doctrine and its alternatives apart from the Descartes-More correspondence. 
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To summarize the main argument of this essay, the extension of power doctrine 
provides one of the most plausible explanations for the conjunction of Leibniz’ claims 
about the non-spatiality of monads with his additional stipulation that monads have a 
derived position in bodies: e.g., the conjunction of (i), “monads in themselves do not even 
have situation with respect to each other—at least one that is real, which extends beyond 
the order of phenomena” (LDB 241-243); and (ii), “for every change, spiritual as well as 
material, has its own place, so to speak, in the order of time, as well as its own location in 
the order of coexistents, or in space. For although monads are not extended, they 
nevertheless have a certain ordered relation of coexistence with others, namely, through 
the machine which they control” (G II 253; L 531). While some commentators have 
striven to account for both (i) and (ii) through appeal to the cognitive aspects of Leibniz’ 
theory (see section 1), this strategy does not in itself provide a solution for those realists 
who accept a world of really extended Leibnizian bodies (such as Garber), nor does it 
explain how the non-cognitive metaphysical/physical description of monadic situation 
fits into Leibniz’ overall plan. That is, for those realists who merely accept the existence 
of an external world apart from the mind (i.e., who reject the Berkeleyan fully idealist 
interpretation but deny really extended bodies), our analysis can supply the historical and 
metaphysical backdrop that motivated these discussions. On the other hand, some 
commentators who accept the reality of extended bodies (once again, Garber) insist on 
the spatiality of monads, but that position directly contradicts (i). In contrast, for those 
who accept the reality of extension (and granting the ideality of geometrical extension), 
the Leibnizian version of EP developed in this essay provides a straightforward and 
satisfactory explanation of both the non-spatiality of the monads and their derived 
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situation in matter. While monads are not situated in space, their activity is situated in 
secondary matter, and hence monads possess a derivative spatiality via their activity—
and this conclusion is in perfect accordance with the basic idea behind the extension of 
power doctrine.  
Of course, there is only indirect evidence in support of an EP conception of monadic 
activity, although, as argued above, that evidence is both mutually consistent and, in 
some discussions, compelling: e.g., “[p]erhaps someone might say that souls are not in 
place but through operation, speaking here according to the old system of influx” (LDB 
123). That Leibniz does not openly reject this interpretation is important, and, since his 
main objections concern an influx of powers among substances, this suggests that a non-
influx variant of EP, as a sort of pre-established harmony version of EP, is consistent 
with his monadic metaphysics. While not conclusive proof, the advantage of a non-influx 
EP interpretation, once again, is that it reconciles a realism concerning Leibnizian 
extended matter with the non-spatiality of monads, whereas the alternative conceptions 
are either inconsistent with the textual evidence or limited to just the cognitive-based 
aspects of Leibniz’ system in their explanation of the external world. The extension of 
power doctrine, a long neglected theme in the complex story that is Leibniz’ 
monadology, thus offers a more successful method of reconciling a commitment to 
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